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ABSTRACT
Digital  Video Recorders  (DVRs)  as  innovative  media  technology are  expected  to  have  a  major  impact  on  the  TV
industry. This paper analyzes the impact of DVRs on the business model of Ad-TV program providers. It introduces
the approach of program choice models which are well established in the media economics literature and enhances
the traditional program choice models by taking into account different levels of DVR diffusion implying different
levels of ad-skipping. The paper shows that DVR diffusion reduces viewer satisfaction and lowers the numbers of
programs offered in Ad-TV. It raises the issue that with significant DVR diffusion only one program provider
broadcasting a so-called 'common denominator' program at relatively low costs can stay in the market. From the
scenario analysis, the paper derives recommendations for the design of business model of Ad-TV program providers
and concludes with a brief summary and an outlook to further research.
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INTRODUCTION
Following  Timmers  (1998,  4),  a  business  model  can  be  defined  as  "an  architecture  for  the  product,  service  and
information flows, including a description of the various business actors and their roles; and a description of the
potential benefits for the various business actors; and a description of the sources of revenues."
In many industries', business models are challenged by innovative media technologies (Pateli and Giaglis, 2005).
One example of such technologies relevant to the TV industry including Ad-TV program providers are Digital Video
Recorders (DVRs).
Ad-TV program providers are defined as program providers whose programs are available to viewers without direct
payment. They procure content from content creators (e.g., Hollywood Studios, news agencies, TV production
companies) and add value by enriching, packing, and presenting it in the form of scheduled programs to viewers
(Wildman and Owen, 1992). They distribute their programs via terrestrial, cable, or satellite distributors. In several
TV  markets  such  as  the  US,  distributors  pay  Ad-TV  program  providers  for  their  content.  In  contrast,  in  several
European countries, distributors charge program providers for showing their program.
Ad-TV program providers operate in dual markets. When attracting viewers by broadcasting programs, Ad-TV
providers generate revenue by selling these consumer contacts to advertisers (Abell, 1980). In other words, the
business model of Ad-TV program providers depends on viewers who possess a value to advertisers as potential
customers. Viewers watch commercials as non-monetary price for free accessible content (Spence and Owen, 1977;
Wildman and Owen, 1985). The generalized business model of Ad-TV program providers is illustrated in Figure 1.
DVRs are specialized set-top boxes that can record up to 1,700 hours of video content on hard disc and allow for
suppressing commercials (ad-skipping) by using 30-second ad-jumps and hence evade 'payment' of the non-monetary
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price. Similar to traditional Videocassette Recorders (VCRs), they allow watching simultaneously broadcasted
programs in succession.
Figure 1. Business Model of Ad-TV Program Providers
While the recording functionality of VCRs did not heavily jeopardize the Ad-TV business model (Harvey and Rothe,
1986), the recording functionality combined with the ad-skipping feature of DVRs are expected to severely challenge
the business model of Ad-TV program providers (Fortunato and Windels, 2005; Loebbecke, 2004).
In this context, this paper aims to investigate the impact of DVRs on the business model of Ad-TV program
providers. It uses the methodology of program choice models which are well established in the media economics
literature (see next section) and enhances the traditional program choice models by taking into account different
levels of DVR diffusion implying different levels of ad-skipping. From the scenario analysis, the paper derives
recommendations for the design of business model of Ad-TV program providers and concludes with a brief summary
and an outlook to further research.
MAJOR PROGRAM CHOICE MODELS IN THE LITERATURE
Major program choice models by Steiner (1952), Rothenberg (1962), and Beebe (1977) help decision makers to
select which programs to broadcast as part of their program planning and their business model.
Steiner (1952) developed his model when a technically limited number of channels restricted program diversity. He
formed viewer groups and distinguished programs into program types like sports or movies. Under a set of modeling
assumptions, valid during the time of his analysis, Steiner compared TV patterns in monopoly and under competition
and showed that competition resulted in a waste of resources and program duplication ('excessive sameness', see also
Hotelling, 1929). He concluded a superiority of monopoly over competition in terms of viewer satisfaction.
Rothenberg (1962) extended Steiner's model as he took into account gradually increasing TV diversity in the early
1960s. He defined a 'common denominator' program as the program type every viewer was willing to watch instead
of and before turning-off the TV. Rothenberg showed that a common denominator program increases competition,
but threatens minority programs in the case of a limited number of channels. In his scenario, a monopolist would
broadcast only the common denominator program reaching all viewers without causing waste of resources.
Finally, Beebe (1977) enriched the models further. He introduced differently skewed viewer distributions among
channels and less preferred choices in preference patterns among viewers. He also took into account program costs
and allowed for unlimited channel capacity. Beebe found that competition among providers was likely to produce
more desirable results than monopoly resulting from limited channel availability.
TRANSFERRING PROGRAM CHOICE MODELS TO THE DVR-DRIVEN TV ERA
Terminology and Assumptions
This paper uses the following terms: Ad-TV program providers are TV stations that present content to viewers.
Programs are sets of content which can be divided into several program types like movies, sports, or comedy. Viewer
satisfaction is measured as the number of first and second choices in viewers' preference patterns that are satisfied.
Total TV Viewing stands for the total of all satisfied choices.
Distributors
Advertisers
Ad-TV
Program Providers Viewers
Content
Creators
Content
Program
Program
Distribution
ValueRevenue
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The analysis assumes that every viewer can be assigned to a viewer group with homogenous tastes regarding
different program types. Viewer groups rank their desired program types through different choices. Without DVRs,
viewers watch commercials during the program as non-monetary price for these programs.
In detail, twelve assumptions (see Figure 2) specify the model. The first seven assumptions are derived from program
choice models in the literature; they relate to viewer characteristics and preferences. Assumptions 8, 9 and 10
directly relate to DVRs. Characteristics of Ad-TV program providers are represented in assumptions 11 and 12.
(1) Viewer groups are highly unequal in size and have homogenous preferences per group
(2) Viewers watch programs of first choices or a common second choice (Rothenberg, 1962);
viewers rather watch the common denominator program than turning-off the TV.
(3) Viewer audience is shared equally in case of program duplication (Steiner, 1952).
(4) Advertisers do not value all viewer groups equally; they have different WTP schemes
(Takada and Henry, 1993).
(5)  Program  types  differ  in  their  cost  structures.  Higher  cost  is  correlated  with  more  viewer
first choices.
(6) Competition occurs within a single program period, e.g., 30 minutes (Steiner, 1952).
(7) Competitors maximize single channel profits (Beebe, 1977).
(8) Viewers with DVRs skip commercials.
(9) Viewers with DVRs watch preferred programs in succession.
(10) The percentage of DVR users is the same over all viewer groups.
(11) Program providers can add mark-ups on the equilibrium price up to a certain amount
without causing market entry of duplicators (Croften, Laband and Long, 2000).
(12) Ad-TV program providers generate revenues by selling commercial time to advertisers at
prices per actually watching viewers (Wilbur, 2005). Other revenue sources like product
placement, sponsoring, or call-ins are ignored.
Figure 2. Assumptions for Transferring Program Choice Models to DVR-Driven TV Era
For illustration purposes, the analysis is organized around a hypothetical numerical example (Beebe, 1977):
It assumes an audience of 8,750 viewers, divided into three groups of 5,000, 2,500, and 1,250 viewers respectively
and different first choices. Group 1 likes to watch Program 1 (P1), whereas Group 2 prefers P2. P3 is the common
denominator program. Each program is associated with different costs. P1 is the most expensive program, whereas
the common denominator P3 is the cheapest. Advertisers have different WTP schemes for each group with different
values for viewers. Without perfect competition, program providers charge advertising prices above equilibrium
price of € 25.00, € 22.00, and € 19.50 for P1, P2, and P3, respectively (see Tables 1a and 1b).
Group 1 2 3
Viewers 5,000 2,500 1,250
Advertisers' WTP
per Viewer (in €) 30 25 20
Preferences
1st Choice P1 P2 P3
2nd Choice P3 P3 -
3rd Choice - - -
Table 1a. Viewer Preferences & Advertisers' WTP per Viewer
Program Costs (in €) Advertising Price per Viewer (in €)
P1 68,000 25.00
P2 44,000 22.00
P3 20,000 19.50
Table 1b. Program Costs and Advertising Price per Viewer
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Situation without DVRs
Without DVRs, the following scenario appears:
P1 P2 P3
No. of
Channels 1 1 1
Viewers 5,000 2,500 1,250
Revenue (in €) 125,000 55,000 24,375
Profit (in €) 57,000 11,000 4,375
Total TV
Viewing
Viewer
Satisfaction
Programs
Offered
8,750 1st choice: 8,750 3
Table 1c. Scenario without DVRs
Situation with DVR Diffusion: Three Scenarios
To investigate the impact of different levels of DVR diffusion on Ad-TV program providers, the following shows
three scenarios - again based on hypothetical numbers - with 10%, 33%, and 75% of viewers using DVRs and thus
skipping commercials (Table 2).
Total
(8,750 Viewers)
Group 1
(5,000 Viewers)
Group 2
(2,500 Viewers)
Group 3
(1,250 Viewers)DVR
Diffusion
(in %)*
without
DVR
with
DVR
without
DVR
with
DVR
without
DVR
with
DVR
without
DVR
with
DVR
10 7,875 875 4,500 500 2,250 250 1,125 125
33 5,863 2,887 3,350 1,650 1,675 825 838 412
75 2,188 6,562 1,250 3,750 625 1,875 313 937
*Percentages point to viewers using DVRs over total viewers
Table 2. Scenarios with Different Levels of DVR Diffusion
With 10% of viewers skipping commercials as using DVR features, program providers would keep the number of
their viewers, but lose 10% of their revenues. The possibility to record content would cause 750 additional viewers to
watch P3 as their second choice. But advertisers could not reach those viewers with their commercials; therefore the
P3 provider cannot gain financial benefit. His profit drops to € 1,938. Overall, the scenario satisfies 750 second
choices in addition to 8,750 first choices. Viewer satisfaction and total TV viewing are larger compared to the
situation without DVRs, while the program diversity remains the same (see Table 3).
P1 P2 P3
No. of Channels 1 1 1
Viewers (without DVR) 4,500 2,500 1,125
Viewers (with DVR) 500 250 875
Revenue (in €) 112,500 49,500 21,938
Profit (in €) 44,500 5,500 1,938
Total
TV Viewing
Viewer
Satisfaction
Programs
Offered
9,500 1st choice: 8,750 2nd choice:750 3
Table 3. Situation with 10% of Viewers Skipping Commercials with DVRs
With 33% of viewers using DVRs and thus skipping commercials, program providers would lose 33% of their
advertising revenues from their respective first choice viewers. P2 would attract only 1,675 viewers who do not use a
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DVR and generate € 36,850 of revenues. Considering P2 costs of € 44,000, the provider of P2 would have to accept a
loss, even if the advertising price for Group 2 were raised to € 25.00 per viewer (generating € 41,875 of revenues).
Hence, the P2 provider would exit the market leaving only a choice of two programs. P2 viewers would be expected
to switch to their second choice P3, which - in this example - is also the common denominator program. The P3
provider would lose 33% of his first choice viewers, but add the previous P2 watchers. Overall, the P3 provider
would gain € 29,004 of profit from 2,513 viewers without DVR and 2,887 with DVRs. This scenario leads to 6,250
satisfied first choices, compared to 8,750 without any DVRs in the market, and 4,150 satisfied second choices. Total
TV viewing would increase to 10,400 (see Table 4).
P1 P2 P3
No. of Channels 1 0 1
Viewers (without DVR) 3,350 0 2,513
Viewers (with DVR) 1,650 0 2,887
Revenue (in €) 83,750 0 49,004
Profit (in €) 15,750 0 29,004
Total
TV Viewing
Viewer
Satisfaction
Programs
Offered
10,400 1st choice: 6,250 2nd choice: 4,150 2
Table 4. Situation with 33% of Viewers Skipping Commercials with DVRs
75% of viewers skipping commercials would lead to 75% less revenue for program providers generated by their first
choice viewers. P1 would disappear as offering P1 would not be affordable at costs of € 68,000 and only 1,250
viewers watching P1 commercials. Viewers of P1 would switch to P3, the common denominator program. The
program provider of P3 would reach all 8,750 viewers, but only 25% of them would watch commercials. Leading to
a profit of € 22,666. This profit would be lower than in a scenario where only 33% of viewers skip commercials, but
- interestingly enough - higher than in the scenario without DVRs where nobody skips commercials. Since P3 would
be the only program left, only one program would be broadcasted. Total TV viewing would decrease to 8,750, the
level of 'no DVRs'. Overall, 1,250 viewers could watch their first choice and 7,500 would watch their second choice
(see Table 5).
P1 P2 P3
No. of Channels 0 0 1
Viewers (without DVR) 0 0 2,188
Viewers (with DVR) 0 0 6,562
Revenue (in €) 0 0 42,666
Profit (in €) 0 0 22,666
Total
TV Viewing
Viewer
Satisfaction
Programs
Offered
8,750 1st choice: 1,250 2nd choice: 7,500 1
Table 5. Situation with 75% of Viewers Skipping Commercials with DVRs
Table 6 summarizes the results of the three purely illustrative scenarios:
10% and 33% of viewers skipping commercials due to the new media stechnology would lead to higher levels of
viewer satisfaction and to more viewers watching TV. The lower number of ad-watching viewers would reduce the
Ad-TV program providers' revenues.
Programs, preferred as first choices by some viewers, would be likely to disappear as soon as the profit break-even
would be missed. Ultimately, only the common denominator program would be shown with an increasing diffusion
of DVRs.
In addition to the ad-skipping functionality, the recording functionality may further influence viewer satisfaction:
Viewers could also watch programs broadcasted simultaneously and thus also satisfy their less preferred choices.
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However, with a strong DVR diffusion (here 75%), the recording functionality of DVRs would lose its relevance, as
viewer satisfaction would fall below the level of 'no DVRs'.
DVR
Diffusion None 10% 33% 75%
Total
TV Viewing 8,750 9,500 10,400 8,750
Viewer
Satisfaction
1st choice: 8,750 1st choice: 8,750
2nd choice: 750
1st choice: 6,250
2nd choice: 4,150
1st choice: 1,250
2nd choices 7,500
Programs
Offered 3 3 2 1
Table 6. Scenario Overview
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BUSINESS MODEL OF AD-TV PROGRAM PROVIDERS
As illustrated with the three program choice scenarios with different levels of DVR diffusion let us derive several
lessons regarding the business model of Ad-TV program providers in the DVR-driven TV era:
Apparently, innovative media technologies such as DVRs challenge the established business model of Ad-TV
program providers. Especially the ad-skipping functionality of DVRs questions the providers' raison d'etre. In
response, Ad-TV providers should focus on the following strategies to align their business model to the DVR-driven
TV era:
(1) Ad-TV program providers need to create interest for the rather cheaply produced common denominator
program, which will be watched by all those viewers whose first choices are not broadcasted any longer
due to lack of profitability. The respective program provider would become the sole Ad-TV 'survivor'. Of
course, any 'winner-takes-it-all' strategy is risky, especially as such a scenario leads to a monopoly situation
associated with lower program quality and less program diversity (Picker, 2004).
(2) Ad-TV program providers should broadcast content that is less vulnerable to ad-skipping and
redistribution. Examples include extremely scarce content such as the Super Bowl final (Hirsch, 1976)
where viewers have incentives to watch programs 'live', even if they are exposing themselves to
commercials.
(3) Ad-TV program providers should prepare for revenue sources other than traditional commercials as those
may lose relevance with increasing DVR diffusion. Examples include sponsoring (Chorianopoulos and
Spinellis, 2006), product placements, or customized commercials (Picker, 2004).
SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In many countries, DVRs have already entered the TV industry. Different players like program providers,
distributors (cable providers), or electronic retailers push the new devices into the market.
The above analysis shed some light on a purposefully simplified situation, it outlines how a significant DVR
diffusion would impact Ad-TV program providers and their business models - generating Ad-TV revenues calculated
as viewers times advertisers' WTP per viewer. The analysis showed that the provider offering a comparatively cheap
and 'low quality' common denominator program would stay as single profitable player in the market.
Taking the  well  established program choice  approach and transferring  it  into  the  era  of  new technologies  such as
DVRs has proven to be valuable. At least it helped to clarify and structure the impact of new technologies on an
industry structure and players' business models.
To push the analysis further, the role of cable providers and their contribution to business model calculations should
also be taken into account. However, the position of cable providers in the value chain of the TV industry differs
among countries. Thus the integration of cable providers necessarily limits the generalizability of insights gained.
The scenarios presented in this paper could be further developed by using a game-theory based simulation approach.
Such an effort could shed light on to the question at which DVR diffusion rate, the Ad-TV market will tip to one
single Ad-TV program provider. Further, such game-theory based simulation could take into account other revenue
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constellations reaching from any combination of cable and advertising revenues to alternative streams of income
stemming from sponsoring or product placement.
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